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ahstzac;t 
In simple words, survivability in combat is achieved by 
not getting hit by the enemy's weapons or withstanding 
the effects of any hits suffered. The likelihood an aircraft 
gets hit while on a mission is referred to as the aircraft's 
susceptibility, and the likelihood the aircraft is killed by 
the hit is referred to as the aircraft's vulnerability. 
Reduction of aircraft susceptibility is achieved by (1) 
the selection of the appropriate weapons, tactics, threat 
suppression, and support jamming for the mission, (2) 
reducing the aircraft's signatures, and (3) incorporating 
on-board threat warning equipment and countermeasures 
in the form of electromagnetic jammers and 
expendables. Reduction of aircraft vulnerability is 
acheved by (1) the use of redundant flight critical 
components, adequately separated so that a single hit 
does not kill them all, (2) properly locating the critical 
components to reduce vulnerability, (3) designing the 
critical components, or &g equipment, to suppress 
the effects of any hits, and (4) shielding those 
components that cannot be protected otherwise. All of 
these concepts for enhancing survivability impact the 
design of the aircraft. The importance of survivability in 
the design of aircraft has varied throughout the 20th 
century from a total neglect to the highest priority. This 
paper presents the evolution of the su~vabil i ty  design 
of aircraft from the beginning of World War I1 to the 
present time. 
Aircraft combat survivability is defined in [ l ]  as 
"the capability of an aircraft to avoid andtor withstand a 
man-made hostile environment." The inability of an 
aircraft to avoid the radars, guns, ballistic projectiles, 
guided missiles, exploding warheads, and other elements 
that make up the hostile air defense environment is 
referred to as the susceptibility of the aircraft. An 
aircraft's susceptibility can be measured by the 
probability the aircraft is hit while on its mission, pH. 
Thus, slow, low-flying aircraft that are easily detected, 
tracked, engaged and eventually hit with one or more 
damage-causing mechanisms associated with the 
enemy's weapons are very susceptible. Fast, high- 
flying aircraft that are difficult to detect, difficult to 
track if detected, difficult to engage if tracked, and 
dficult to hit if engaged are relatively unsusceptible. 
The inability of an aircraft to withstand any hits by 
the hostile environment is referred to as the 
vulnerability of the aircraft. An aircraft's vulnerability 
can be measured by the conditional probability the 
aircraft is killed given a hit, P,. Aircraft that have one 
engine, no fuel system fire/explosion protection, 
redundant but collocated hydraulic systems with 
flammable hydraulic fluid, and one unprotected pilot are 
very vulnerable. Aircraft with two widely separated 
engines, protected fuel systems, redundant and separated 
hydraulic systems with non-flammable hydraulic fluid, 
and shielding around the pilot are relatively 
invulnerable. 
The survivability of an aircraft can be measured by 
the probability of survival, P,, which depends upon the 
aircraft's susceptibility and vulnerability according to 
the equation 
Ps = 1 - PHP, 
Thus, survivability is enhanced when susceptibility and 
vulnerability are reduced. 
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Another aspect of survivability is the ability to 
rapidly repair any damage sustained in battle. If this 
damage cannot be quickly repaired the aircraft may not 
be returned to action in time to contribute to the final 
outcome; and in essence it becomes a 'killed' aircraft. 
Thus, the design of an aircraft to allow the rapid repair 
of battle damage is an indirect contributor to 
survivability, not because it increases the survivability 
of the individual aircraft, but because it enhances force 
reconstitution and, consequently, force survivability. 
Any particular characteriac of the aircraft, specific 
piece of equipment, design technique, armament, or 
tactic that reduces either the susceptibility or the 
vulnerability of the aircraft has the potential for 
increasing survivability and is referred to as a 
survivability enhancement feature. [l]  Table 1 contains 
a list of some of the survivability enhancement features 
that have been used on aircraft. Each of the survivability 
enhancement features listed in Table 1 can be grouped 
under one of the six concepts for reducing susceptibility 
or six concepts for reducing vulnerability. Table 2 
contains the twelve survivability enhancements 
concepts with an example of a particular survivability 
enhancement feature under each concept. 
Combat survivability as a formal design discipline 
for aircraft is a relatively new concept. Although many 
aircraft of the past were designed with survivability in 
mind, particularly during WW 11, until recently there 
was no "systems approach to the survivability design 
solution. Guns and missiles were added for seEdefense, 
fuel systems were protected from fire and explosions, 
better tactics were developed electronic countermeasures 
(ECM) were used, more realistic training was provided, 
structures were made more resistant to enemy fire, and 
camouflage paint schemes were applied. However, all of 
this was done within the context of the individual 
aircraft design dwiplines, and no attempt was made to 
justify the inclusion of any of these survivability 
enhancement features in the design other than to note 
that aircraft that had them lived longer in combat were 
"better" or more effective than those that didn't. The 
hard lessons learned in combat were fed back into the 
design of new and improved versions. 
There were two reasons for this historical lack of a 
systems approach to survivability and a quantification 
of the "payoffs" or increase in operational effectiveness 
and the costs associated with a more survivable design. 
First, the systems approach to aircraft design had not 
been fully developed. Second, there were no specific 
design requirements imposed by the military Services 
on the various measures of survivability, such as the 
maximum allowable P, or vulnerable area (that a m  
on the aircraft which if hit would cause an air& kill) 
or radar cross section, because survivability was not 
considered to be a formal attribute of a military aircraft. 
Consequently. there was no apparent need for a formal 
dmipline. 
The importance of survivability in the design of 
military aircraft increased dramatically in the middle 
1960's when many aircraft, not specifically designed to 
be survivable, were shot down in Southeast Asia 
(SEA). In the years from 1963 to 1973, the U. S. 
military Services lost approximately 5,000 aircraft to 
enemy fire in SEA. The losses were nearly equally 
h d e d  between fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. 
Perhaps the first publication to bring attention to the 
technology that could make aircraft more survivable was 
the paper "Design of Fighter Aircrai? for Combat 
Survivability," published in 1969. [2] 
Because of the U.S. military's experience over the 
past five decades with aircraft that were not specifically 
designed to survive in combat, survivability has become 
a "critical system characterisk" that has emerged as a 
distinct and important design discipline. A viable, cost- 
effective technology exists for reducing susceptibility 
and vulnerability, a methodology exists for assessing 
survivability, education in survivability is available, 
testing for survivability is mandated, top level 
survivability design guidance is prescribed, and 
quantified requirements on the susceptibility and 
vulnerability of air& are now routinely specified. 
Table 3 shows the history of the requirements for 
survivability since 1950. Much of the c r d t  for the 
increased emphasis on the survivability of aircrafl goes 
to the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft 
Survivability (JTCGIAS), which was established in 
1971 with a goal to develop survivability as a design 
discipline. Credit also goes to the Department of 
Defense survivability organizations, the survivability 
engineers in the aircraft industry, and those military 
program managers that made sure their aircraft were 
designed to be survivable. 
This paper will review the evolution of the 
survivability design of aircraft from the beginning of 
































































World War I1 to the present time. The review will 
examine both susceptibility and vulnerability reduction. 
However, because of the classified nature of much of the 
technology for susceptibility reduction, the paper will 
emphasize vulnerability reduction. 
Susceptibility reduction has been a goal of the 
tactician from the beginning. The tactics, weapons 
selection, mission planning systems. force packaging, 
and threat suppression used by the military balance the 
requirement to accomplish the mission with the 
expected aircraft losses. This is known as managing 
attrition. Managing attrition by avoiding the enemy's 
air defense has always been a high priority goal. During 
WW 11, hundreds of B-17s flew at high altitude in box 
formations, escorted by P-47 and P-5 1 fighters looking 
for the enemy fighters. The bombers were located far 
enough apart - so that an explodmg shell from an anti- 
aircraft artillery piece (AAA), known as flak, would not 
damage or kill more than one aircraft - but close 
enough together so that the enemy fighters could not 
easily manewer between them. They were loaded d o w  
with twin-50 cal machine guns mounted in electrically 
driven turrets, and eight of the ten crew members were 
firing guns at the enemy fighters. The weight of the 
guns and ammunition was approximately twice the 
weight of the bombs canied. [3] The B-17s flew during 
the day, which made them more susceptible, because 
they used the Norden bombsight which xequed the 
bombardier to see the target. The British flew their 
Lancaster and Halifax bombers at night because they had 
a better chance of avoiding the fighters and the flak. As 
a result, they were less susceptible and hence more 
survivable at night. However, it also was more dficult 
to destroy a particular factory or bridge when bombing 
at night. The development of electronic countermeasures 
to the early radarsystems was a high priority item, and 
radar-reflecting chaff or "window" was used extensively, 
after some early hesitation because of the fear the enemy 
might use it against the allied radars. References [4] and 
[5] present a W e d  history of the use of electronic 
countermeasures in WW 11. 
Many of the tactics used to avoid the hostile 
environment in SEA in the decade from 1963-72 were 
essentially the same as those used in WW 11, such as 
formations of bombers escorted by fighters. However, 
the bombers, such as the B-52, F-105, F-4, A-4, A- 
6, and A-7, had little or no self-defense capability. 
They relied totally on the fighter escorts, such as the F- 
4, to keep the enemy fighters away. The surface-to-air 
guided missile (SAM) emerged as a major threat to 
contend with, and on-board threat warning receivers and 
electronic jamming equipment, and the support 
jamming provided by aircraft such as the E A 4 ,  became 
major contributors to survivability. Specially modlfied 
aircraft were used in the suppression of enemy air 
defense (SEAD) role to seek out and destroy the enemy 
SAM launch sites. Mission profiles were often used 
that kept the aircraft out of the high altitude envelopes 
of the SAMs but put them within range of ground- 
based small arms and AAA fire. Reference [5] presents a 
brief history of the use of electronic warfare in the SEA 
conflict. 
As a result of the large number of tactical and 
strategic aircraft lost in the SEA conflict, a major 
revolution in the design priorities of military aircraft 
began in the late 1970's when the first stealth aircraft 
programs were started in an attempt to reduce amdl 
susceptibility without the use of large numbers of 
supporting aircraft. These so-called stealthy aircraft 
such as the F-117, A-12, F-22. RAH-66, and the E 
2, look mfferent. Their engine inlets and exhausts are 
modified, their wing sweep angles are high, some of 
them lack the traditional vertical tail, and they do not 
have the many bumps and bulges that non-stealthy 
arrcraft have. Even the relatively small stealth aimaft 
carry their ordnance inside. 
There are many other changes associated with 
susceptibility reduction that are not so obvious. Because 
of the stealthy design. the flight control system may 
have to contend with statically unstable aircraft. 
Manufacturing procedures must contend with different 
materials, higher tolerances, and complex shaping 
requirements; and the sensors must be properly located 
on the aircraft to minimize their contribution to the 
aircraft's signatures while maintaining their ability to 
sense. 
Some other not-soobvious design impacts are 
related to the requirements associated with the electronic 
warfare equipment canied by the aircraft. This 
equipment provides the concepts of threat warning, 
noise jamming and deceiving, and expendables. 
Adequate space, cooling, and electrical power for the 
































































processors, sensors, and data buses put additional 
requirements on the design. Should the countermeasures 
packages be carried externally or internally. Where are 
the antennas located? Will they affect the radar 
signature? Another not-s~bvious impact of 
susceptibility reduction, but one that can be a major 
contributor to aircraft weight, is the mission flight 
profile. Aircraft are designed to fly a particular flight 
profile, such as high-low-low-high. With this profile, 
the aircraft takes off, climbs to high altitude, and 
efficiently cruises toward the target. It then drops down 
to a low altitude to avoid detection by the enemy's air 
defense sensors and high altitude SAMs and jinks to 
avoid being hit by enemy gunfire. The target is attacked 
at low altitude, typically with a popup maneuver to 
acquire the target. After attacking the target, the aircraft 
heads for home, first at a low altitude until out of the 
enemy's weapon envelopes, and then at a high altitude 
for optimum cruise efficiency. The drop down to low 
altitude, which is solely for enhanced survivability, puts 
the aircraft in a much more severe flight environment. 
Drag increases significantly, fuel is burned at a much 
higher rate to maintain the fast speed required to survive 
the transit through the enemy territory, and the air loads 
on the aircraft are much higher than those at high 
altitude with no maneuvering. One of the most 
attractive features of a stealthy aircraft is the potential 
use of a high-high-high flight profile; it keeps the 
aircraft out of the range of the ground-based guns, a 
long-time, lethal foe of aircraft. 
The vulnerability of an aircraft is reduced by 
designing the aircraft to withstand any hits by the 
damage-causing mechanisms created by the enemy 
warheads, such as penetrators, fragments, incendiary 
particles, and blast. Ths  is acomplished by ensuring 
that the critical components on the aircraft continue to 
function after the aircraft is hit. Critical components axe 
those components whose loss of function or whose kill 
mode leads to the loss of an essential function, such as 
lift, thrust, and control for flight. The kill modes 
associated with the components of each of the major 
systems on an aircraft are listed in Table 4.  
Vulnerability is reduced by preventing these lull modes 
from occurring. 
The vulnerability reduction features used on the 
aircraft of WW I1 were the result of wartime experience. 
Most of the aircraft that were in use at the beginning of 
the war, such as the Fairey Battle, Brewster Buffalo, 
Grumman F4F Wildcat, and Boeing B-17, were either 
extensively moaed during the war to make them more 
survivable or were used on missions with low threat 
levels. An excellent paper on the effects of enemy gun 
fire on the German Ju-88 notes that the cost of the Ju- 
88s lost in combat was the largest single expenditure of 
the entire program. [6] According to [6], the operations 
of the Ju-88 were dwontinued in 1944 because the 
opposition of the Allies' standard pursuit aircraft had 
become so strong. References [I], [ 3 ] ,  and [7] present 
many of the vulnerability features used on several 
aircraft of the WW 11. Table 5 lists some of these 
features. Each feature was incorporated to prevent one or 
more of the kill modes listed in Table 4 from occurring. 
Many of the aircraft that fought in the Southeast 
Asia conflict were designed for high altitude fighting 
with missiles and for nuclear war. For example, the 
McDonnell F 4  Phantom I1 was originally designed as 
a deck-launched interceptor for the U.S. Navy that 
would dash out to the enemy bombers approachmg the 
carrier and kill them with air-to-air missiles. There was 
no (or very little) attention paid during the &sign of the 
F-4 (or to the design of any other aircraft of that era) to 
the damage that enemy guns or guided missiles might 
do to the aircraft. Due to this lack of attention to 
survivability during design, the U.S. military began to 
lose a significant number of aircraft as the SEA conflict 
intensified. 
Because of these losses, the Air Force sent a fact- 
finding team into the a m  in 1966 to detennine the loss 
cause(s). The team interviewed crew members who had 
been shot down and recovered and the wingmen of those 
not recovered. They also inspected and collected data on 
battltxiamaged aircraft that had returned to base. The 
battle damage data was used to determine the location 
and types of damage that did not result in an aircraft 
loss. The original Air Force directive that identified the 
problem conjectured that the aircraft were falling out of 
the sky because of damage to the structure. However, 
the on-site team determined that the single most 
important cause of aircraft losses was actually fuel 
system fire or explosion. Another significant cause of 
aircraft losses was damage to the flight control system. 
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Often, damage to the redundant (but collocated) 
hydraulic components would result in hard-over control 
surface failures and an uncontrollable aircraft, forcing 
the pilot to eject - if he could. Many of the control 
failures were caused by a fuel or hydraulic fluid fire that 
destroyed the control components. 
After the first Air Force team returned in 1966, 
they recommended a number of actions to reduce the 
future loss of aircraft. All were approved by Air Force 
Headquarters. One recommendation was to conduct 
vulnerability assessments on the tactical a i d  
operating in North Vietanm (the F-4, RF-4, F-105, 
and RF-101) and to develop vulnerability reduchon 
retrofit-packages based upon the combat data collected 
and the vulnerability assessments. The primary 
emphasis was on the suppression of fuel system fire and 
explosion and the prevention of the loss of flight 
control. Self-sealing fuel tanks and lines and the 
placement of flexible, reticulated polyurethane orange 
foam into the fuel tanks were some of the vulnerability 
reduction features designed to prevent fuel-related fires 
and explosions. 
Features designed to prevent the loss of control 
were added to both the F-105 and the F-4. A stabilator 
lock that was activated by the pilot if all hydrauhc 
power was lost at the stabilator actuator was added to 
the F-105. On the F-4, an Awillary Power Unit 
(MU) was added to the stabilator actuator. and armor 
was placed below the hydraulic components. Another 
change to the flight control system of the F-4 
concerned the hydraulic power supplied to the aluminum 
aileron actuators. The original hydraulic system 
consisted of two primary flight control systems, PC1 
and PC2, and the utility system. Both PC1 and PC2 
supplied power to both aileron actuators. Thus, a h t  
near either of the aileron actuators (or a fatigue mck) 
could damage the aluminum actuator, causing the loss 
of both PC 1 and PC2, and the subsequent loss of the 
aircraft. In the more survivable design, the aluminum 
actuators were replaced with steel actuators, and the 
hydraulic lines were replumbed, with utility replacing 
PC1 in one wing and PC2 in the other wing. With this 
less vulnerable design, a hit near the aileron actuator 
could cause a loss of PC1 and utility, or PC2 and 
utility, but not both PC 1 and PC2. [8] 
This vulnerability reduction design of the aileron 
hydraulic system saved the lives of at least 24 air crews 
that were flying the rnOdLkd F-4 when they lost all 
hydraulics in one wing. Twelve of those aircraft were in 
a combat zone. The resulting savings due to this 
parhcularfeature were estimated to be $51M (at $2SM 
per aircraft) plus the lives of the 24 air crews. The cost 
of the modification was $9M, but it would have been 
much less had the hydraulic separation been in the 
original design. [8] There are many other examples of 
aircraft modifications that were made to reduce 
vulnerabilities that were discovered in combat. Table 6 
lists some of the features incorporated on the aircraft 
that fought in SEA. These features were added to 
prevent one or more of the kill modes listed in Table 4. 
Many of them, if not most, were retrofitted and many 
also contributed to aircraft safety. 
Many of the aircraft flyng today were designed 
during and after the SEA conflict. The lessons learned in 
combat in that conflict have strongly influenced the 
design of these aircraft. Three of these aircraft the Air 
Force's A-1OA Thunderbolt I1 (affectionately known as 
the Warthog), the Naky's F/A-18A Hornet, and the 
Army's UH-60A Blackhawk, have been selected as 
examples to illustrate the technology for reducing 
vulnerability that evolved from the late 1960's through 
the middle 1980's. 
The A-lo's primary mission was to kill tanks with 
a 30mm gun and air-to-surface missiles. In this role. it 
would face a variety of guns and missiles. and it's 
vulnerability would be tested in combat. Consequently, 
the aircrafi was the first modem fixed-wing aircrafi to 
be designed, from its inception, to a complete set of 
survivability requirements. It incorporates over 100 
vulnerability reduction features, many of which were 
verified by ballistic testing. In Operation Desert Storm 
in 1991, the A-10 had an opportunity to show what it 
could do. According to Air Force Capt. Paul Johnson, 
who flew home from a mission over Kuwait with a 
gaping hole in his A-lo's right wing, "We always 
expected the A-10 to be a tough customer, but it hadn't 
been proven." [9] The survivability and battle damage 
repau features that were designed into the A-10 'paid 
off in Desert Storm. According to an article in 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, "Survivability 
features designed into the Fairchild A-10 proved their 
worth during its first exposure to combat In Operation 
Desert Storm, when many Thunderbolts flew home 
despite extensive battle damage sustained in successful 
low-level attacks on enemy tanks and artillery. . . . Most 
of the damaged aircraft were returned quickly to service 
by U. S. Air Force aircraft battle damage qxur  (ABDR) 
crews. . . . Of 20 aircraft that were at least 'significantly' 
damaged, only one could not be returned to service by 
ABDR crews . . . ." [lo] According to Capt. Johnson, 
































































"The guys developed a great affection for the airplane 
and a very healthy respect for what it could absorb." [9] 
The F/A-18 was the Navy's first aircraft in which 
survivability considerations played a major role in the 
design. Trade-off studies were performed to determine 
the payoffs and costs associated with each enhancement 
feature considered. Those features that had high pay-offs 
with relatively low costs were incorporated because the 
Hornet is both a fighter and an attack aircraft and had to 
perform well in both roles. The FIA-18 is the Navy's 
most survivable aircraft flying today. It, too, proved 
itself to be a survivable aircraft in Desert Storm. 
Because of the large number of Army helicopters 
lost to small arms fire in SEA, the UH-60, which was 
the winning design for the Utility Tactical Transport 
Arcraft System (UTTAS) competition, had a firm 
design requirement on vulnerability. The helicopter in 
forward flight was to be capable of safe flight for at 
least 30 minutes after a single hit by a 7.62mm API 
projectile. [I 11 In the vernacular of the vulnerability 
engineer, the helicopter must have zero vulnerable area 
for a B level attrition kill. A minimum vulnerable area 
to the 23mm HE1 was a design goal. The reduced 
vulnerability paid off in Grenada. "The BLACKHAWK 
played a key role in combat during the 1983 Gmwb 
invasion. . . . It sustained and survived small arms and 
23mm anti-aircraft fire while carrying out its mission of 
transporting and supporting Army Rangers. Of the 32 
BLACKHAWKS used in Grenada, ten were damaged in 
combat. One helicopter had 45 bullet holes that 
damaged the rotor blades, fuel tanks, and control 
systems, yet it still managed to complete its mission." 
[I21 
To illustrate the state-of-the-art of vulnerability 
reduction design in the recent past, the vulnerability 
reducbon features used on the A-lOA, FIA-18A, and 
the UH-60A to prevent the system kill modes from 
occurring are given in Tables 7a-e and Figs. 1-3 for the 
major systems. [13, 14, and 151 All three aircraft, as 
well as the F-117 and many of the other aircraA 
involved in the operation, proved themselves to be 
survivable aircraft in Desert Storm. They took some 
hits, but suffered very few losses. This combat 
experience validated the approach to survivability design 
that was taken during 1970's and 80's. 
The current generation of operational aircraft, as 
well as those in development, are undergoing extensive 
life fire testing. The Joint Live Fire (JLF) test program, 
initiated in the early 1980's, has tested the F-15, F-16, 
FIA-18, AV-8B, UH40A, and AH-64A to both non- 
explosive and explosive ballistic projectiles. The 
congressionally mandated Live Fire Test (LFT) law for 
aircraft in development, passed in FY87, requires 
realistic vulnerability tests on the complete aircrafl, 
with all combustibles on-board, using weapons likely 
to be encountered in combat. If such tests are 
unreasonably expensive and impractical, a waiver must 
be approved by the Secretary of Defense prior to the 
entry into Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development, and an alternate realistic test program 
plan must be submitted and approved. Vulnerability 
testing of components and subsystems early in the 
development cycle is strongly encouraged in order to 
identify vulnerabilities and eliminate them without 
major weight and cost penalties. The law has had a 
major beneficial effect on the vulnerability reduction of 
many of the aircraft currently operational, as well as 
those in development, and this beneficial effect should 
continue into the future. [16] 
The current generation of military tactical aircraft 
now in development or low rate initial production, e.g., 
the F-22, FIA-18E/F, V-22, and RAH-66, have 
strong survivability requirements. The C-17 is the first 
cargo aircraft with survivability requirements on the 
original design because its mission requires it to go in 
harm's way. Both susceptibility and vulnerability are 
being reduced using the technology that has evolved 
over the last thirty years. A balanced design between 
susceptibility andvulnerability issues is achieved using 
trade-off studies to determine the proper balance for the 
Werent a i r d  with their different missions. This 
approach is expected to continue into the future, with an 
improved capability for conducting integrated 
survivability assessments and tradwff studies, 
including tactics, electronic warfare, and signature 
reduction, developed through the efforts of the 
JTCGIAS and others. 
The designer of fiture aircraft will face different 
problems when trying to design survivable aircraft but 
the fundamental approches to solving those problems 
remains the same: reduce susceptibility and reduce 
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vulnerability. One of the survivability issues on aircraft 
in design today, as well as those of the future, is the 
increased use of composite materials, which affect (1) an 
aircraft's signatures, and hence susceptibility, (2) its 
structural vulnerability, and (3) the ability to rapidly 
q m r  battle damage. Other issues are the possible 
redurnon in the number of engines on an aircraft due to 
the increase in engine reliability, the trend toward an all 
or mostly electric aircraft the significant increase in the 
reliance on avionics, with digital data buses transporting 
flight critical signals throughout the aircraft and the 
mandated requirement to find a replacement for the 
current fire exhnguishing/fuel tank inertmg systems 
that use a environmentally destructive gas, such as 
Halon 130 1. 
Survivability has come a long way in the past 
thirty years. It is now a combat tested, critical system 
characteristic, with performance requirements, an 
enhancement technology, and an assessment 
methodology. The original goal of the JTCGIAS in 
197 1 to establish survivability as a design discipline 
has been acheved. This goal has been reached because 
the U. S. military Services have learned that aircraft that 
have not been designed to survive in combat are not 
effective in combat. 
However, there are many changes that are either 
here now or are looming ahead that can impact the 
survivability of those aircraft that will be operating in 
the twenty-first century. The affordability of modem 
military a i d  has become a major issue, with the 
potential consequence of less survivable aircraft because 
of a reliance on relatively inexpensive, off-the-shelf, 
peacetime designs. The authors believe that when 
procuring affordable military aircraft, survivability must 
not 'drop through the crack' because of the elimination 
of the military specifications and standards that have 
become a controversial issue. Mlitary aircraft must be 
designed to fight and survive in wartime, not just to fly 
in peacetime. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is downsizing, 
and the availability of people to pay attention to those 
details that are unique to combat may decline. The 
authors believe that as DoD downsizes, the resources, 
personnel, and facilities requmd for survivability 
assessment, design, and test and evaluation, must not be 
downsized below a critical mass. Providing support to 
program managers, developing new technology, and 
conducting realistic live fire and operational tests to 
evaluate susceptibility, vulnerability, and survivability 
requires an investment for the security of the nation. 
Finally. the identification of the specific threats to 
future aircraft is difficult, at best, which may lead some 
people to the conclusion that there are no serious threats 
to contend with; and if there are no threats, survivability 
can be ignored. The authors believe that hstory has 
shown, and will continue to show, that there is always 
another threat waiting just around the comer. Having 
aircraft available that are both lethal and survivable will 
help to dissuade potential adversaries from any foolish 
action. 
In conclusion, the authors believe that if the 
survivability community continues to work together in 
the future, as it has in the past, then survivability as a 
design discipline will continue to mature, and the U. S. 
military aircraft of the future will be more survivable 
and thus more effective. 
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Table 1 Some Typical Survivability Enhancement Features 
Table 2 The Twelve Survivability Enhancement Concepts [l] 
Susceotibilitv Reduction 
Threat waning 
- missile approach waminp receiver 
Noise jamming and deceiving 




-shaping to reduce the radar signature 
Threat suppression 
- anti-radiation missile 
Tactics, performance, & crew skill & experience 
- terrain following 
Vulnerability Reduction 
Component redundancy (with separation) 
- two widely separated engines 
Component location 
- no fuel adjacent to air inlets 
Passive damage suppression 
- explosion suppression foam in fuel tank ullages 
Active damage suppression 




- nonflammable hydraulics 
Table 4 A List of System Damage-Caused Failure (Kill) Modes [l] 
Euel 
Fuel supply depletion 
In-tank fuelexplosion 
Void space firelexplosion 
Sustained exterior fire 
Hydrauhc ram 
Loss of lubrication 
MechanicaYstructural damage 
Elefmdhw 





Foreign object ingestion 
Inlet flow distortion 
Lubrication starvation 
Compressor case perforation 
or distortion 
Combustor Case perforation 
Turbine section failure 
Exhaust duct failure 
Engine controls and 
accessories failure 
C E W  
Injury, incapacitation, or death 
Armament 
Disruption of control signal path 
Loss of control power 
Loss of aircraft motion data 
Damage to control surfaces and 
hinges 










































































Table 3 New U.S. Military Aircraft Starts (Approximate Dates) 
Army Air Force Navy .............. 
OH-6 F-111, G I 4 1  
F 4 C ,  F-5 CH-53 ................................................................. 
A-37 A-7 
ov-10 




features built in F-l F-14, s-3 
B-1 Vulnerabilitv a . - 
Jmajor consideration 
A H 4 4  A-1 0 ............. ....................................................F... U?Wdght.Ogh?.er 
UH-60 )( - with some toughness 
Originally a FIA-18 
British designm AV--8B \ 
Designed to take a single hit anywhere 
on the aircraft and fly for 30 minutes 
First generation 
of stealth ~ - 1  17 
G17*  %Survivability 
requirements 





for all threats 
Second generation F-15E 
of stealth -b &2* v-22* / 
/ F-22' 
Third generation Strongest survivability 
requirements to date of stealth 
Significant 
: :  :.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:/.:~~YJ"~~J!?.:.:.: . ....................................................... - - . - - 7 RAH46* In the des~gn ,A-1 8"F* Desert Storm 
' = in development or limited production 
* = cancelled 
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Table 6 Some Vulnerability Reduction Features used on SEA Aircraft 
Table 5 Some Vulnerability Reduction Features used on WW 11 Aircraft 
Armor plating 
Location of cooling and lubrication components 
Bullet-proof glass canopy 
Rugged construction 
A i r a l e d  engines 
Emergency extension of landing gear 
Back-up propeller feathering subsystem 
Self-sealing fuel tanks 
Fuel venting and void space filling 
Fuel tank ullage inerting 
Fuel tank depressurization 
Fire extinguishing (crew and engines) 
Fuel tank cross-over lines with shut-off valves 
Firewalls 
Orange foam in fuel tanks 
Back-up flight controls and surfaces 
Stabilator lock 
Bomb bay fire extinguishers 
Improved self-sealing fbel tanks 
Steel liners added to aluminum hydraulic barrels 
I Most fuel lines located inside I Most fuel lines located inside I Cross feed capability 
Rerouted hydraulics in wings 
Added AF'U 
Independent, self-sealing fuel feed tanks and lines 
Ram air emergency power package 
Emergency pressurization for fuel transfer 
Armor 
A-1OA I FIA-18A I UH-60A 
Kill Mode: Fuel Supply Depletion 
tanks Itanks I 
Cross feed capability located I Cross feed capability 
Table 7a Some Vulnerability Reduction Features used on the Fuel System of the A-IOA, 
FIA- 1 8 4  and UH-60A Aircraft 
Two self-sealing feed tanks 
located away from ignition 
sources 
Short, self-sealing feed lines 
Wing fuel used first 
Redundant feed flow I Backup pump and redundant feed I I 
Two self-sealing feed tanks 
located away from ignition 
sources 
Short, self-sealing feed lines 
Wing fuel used first 
tanks Itanks I 
Open cell foam in all tanks 1 Open cell foam in wing tanks I Closed cell foam around tanks 
Two self-sealinglcrashworthy 
tanks located away from ignition 
sources 
Short, self-sealing feed lines 
Engine-mounted suction pumps 
Kill Mode: FirelExplosion 
Two self-sealing feed tanks 
located away from ignition 
sources 
Short, self-sealing feed lines 
Most fuel lines located inside 
Draining and vents in vapor areas I I 
Kill Mode: Hydraulic Ram 
Minimum fuel in wings during I Minimum fuel in wings during I Crashworthy fuel tanks also 
Closed cell foam in dry bays 
around tanks 
Two self-sealing feed tanks 
located away from ignition 
sources 
Short, self-sealing feed lines 
Most fuel lines located inside 
11 
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Two self-sealinglcrashworthy 
tanks located away from ignition 
sources 
Short, self-sealing feed lines 
Engine-mounted suction pumps 





Damage control design of short 

































































Table 7b Some Vulnerability Reduction Features used on the Propulsion System of the A-lOA, 
F/A-1 SA, and UH-6OA Aircraft 
A- 1 OA I FIA- 1 8A I UH-60A 
Kill Mode: Loss of Thrust 
Two widely separated engines 
Dual fire walls 
Two engines 
Fire walls between engine, 
AMAD, and APU 
Table 7c Some Vulnerability Reduction Features used on the Flight Control System of the A-lOA, 
F/A-184 and UH-6OA Ancraft 
Two widely separated engines 
Titanium fire walls 
Fail-active fire detection with two 
shot fire extinguishng 
Engine case armor 
Separation between fuel tanks and 
air inlets 
One engine out capability 
Fire detection and one shot 
extinguishing system 
Blade containment for fan, 
compressor, and turbine 
Inlet ductlfuel tank hydrodynamic 
ram damage control 
One engine out capability 
A- 1 OA I F/A- 18A I UH-60A 
Kill Modes: Disruption of Control Signal Path and Loss of Control Surfaces 
Two independent, separated hyd 
power subsystems 
AIC can be controlled without 
hyd power with mech controls and 
dual, electrically powered trim 
actuators 
Fire detection with two shot fire 
extinguishing 
Widely separated engine to 
transmission input modules 
No fuel ingestion 
Good one engine out capability 
Two independent, separated Two flight control computers 
mechanical flight controls with with four separated electrical 
mechanical d l s c 0 ~ e c t ~  signal lines to actuators 
Two rudders and elevators Backup mechanical controls to 
tail 
Armor around stick where 
redundant controls converge 
I I Controls are ballistically tolerant 
Kill Modes: 
Two independent, separated 
mechanical flight controls with 
mechanical disconnects 
Tail rotor is stable if pitch rod is 
severed 
Spring drives tail rotor blades to 
fixed pitch setting if control 
Less flammable hyd fluid 
Loss of Control Power and Hydraulic Fluid Fire 
Less flammable hyd fluid 1 Less flammable hyd fluid 
Two independent, separated hyd 
power subsystems with two 
circuits per subsystem 
Ripstop actuators 
Reservoir level sensing 1 
Two independent, separated, and 
shielded hyd power subsystems 
Third electrically dnven backup 
can power either or both primary 
subsystems with quick 
disconnects and leak isolation 
valves 
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Table 7d Some Vulnerability Reduction Features used on the Air Crew System of the A-lOA, 
F/A-184 and UH-60A Aircraft 
A- 1 OA I FIA- 18A I UH40A 
Kill Modes: Incapacitation or Death 
Pilot sits in a titanium/aluminum I I Crashworthv armored seats and 
armor bathtub 
Spa11 shields between armor and 
retention system 
Shatterproof cockpit window 
pilot 
Bullet resistant windscreen 
Table 7e Some Vulnerability Reduction Features used on the Rotor Blade & Drive Train 
of the UH4OA Aircraft 
Minimum-spa11 materials used in 
Spa11 resistant canopy side panels 
UH4OA 
Kill Modes: Loss of Lubrication and Structural Damage 
Main Transmission 1 Main rotor I Tail Rotor Drive System 
cockpit 
Kevlar armor to stop HE1 
fragments 
tolerant 
Damaged parts thrown away from 
the helicopter 
Modularized transmission 
eliminates exposed h g h  speed 
shafts and multiple lube systems 
with exposed oil components 
Operates more than one hour after 
loss of all oil 
Noncatastrophic failure allows 
autorotation 
13 
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Rotor blades tolerant to HE1 
projectiles 
Elastomeric hub with no lube, 
tolerant to HE1 proiectiles 
Large vertical tail with log boom 
provides anti-torque in forward 
flight 
Shaft supports provide damping 
for damaged shaft 
No bearings or lube in cross- 
beam rotor 


































































Can be Flown 
without Hydraulics 
Protected 
Fig. 1 Some Vulnerability Reduction Features on the A-1OA Thunderbolt I1 [13] 
Fig. 2 Some Vulnerability Reduction Features on the FJA-18A (Courtesy of McDonnell Aerospace) 
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Large Vertical Stabilizer 
Triple Redundant, Fail-safe 
23mm Tolerant 




Redundant Suction Fuel System with 
Self-sealing Fuel Tanks and Lines 
I Redundant and 
Armored Pilot and Separated Main 
Copilot seats with Rotor Flight Controls 
One-Piece Bucket 
Fig. 3 Some Vulnerability Reduction Features on the UH-60A (Courtesy of Sikorsky Aircraft Division) 
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